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SOLVENCY AND LIQUIDITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
MINSKY'S THEORY OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
by H. Visser 
"Men of business have keen sensations but short memories" 
Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street (1920, p. 155). 
Introduction 
In macroeconomic theory not much attention is paid to financial 
markets, though modern market economies cannot function without a 
complicated financial structure, as has been documented by 
Goldsmith (1969). It is usually assumed that the information on 
financial conditions contained in money demand and supply functions, 
summarized in the LM-relationship in IS/LM-models, is all we need in 
this respect. It is admitted, of course, that there is a credit 
market, for otherwise there could be no price of credit, i.e. no 
interest rate. However, by virtue of Walras's Law any one equation 
from a general equilibrium system in which economie actors are 
subject to the budget restriction can be left out when solving the 
system and usually it is the credit market that gets out of sight. 
Such a procedure obscures one's view of the adjustment mechanism 
and implies that the credit market does not generate shocks. 
It is true that there are models which explicitly provide for a 
market for credit. These models meet the first objection formulated 
above, but not the second one. First of all, Patinkin's meticulously 
expounded general equilibrium model with its Walrasian markets for 
both money and credit (bonds) comes to mind (Patinkin 1965, Part I, 
especially Ch. XII). 
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This model is used to describe the characteristics of the system in 
comparative static analysis and to derive the equilibrating mechanism, 
with the bond market exerting its influence on interest rates and 
consumer spending via portfolio composition and wealth effects. 
Patinkin is not interested in situations where the credit system 
collapses. Apart from changes brought about by monetary policy, the 
demand and supply functions for bonds are given and constant (see for 
an analysis in a similar vein for open economies Visser 1982). The 
only negative influence of credit market conditions on employment 
results from the minimum interest rate (Patinkin 1965 pp. 349 - '50). 
K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer also explicitly consider credit markets 
(cf K. Brunner 1971; K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer 1976), but their 
interest is in tracing the transmission process of monetary and fis-
cal impulses. The volume of credit plays no independent role. 
Recently, B.J. Friedman advocated paying more attention to the 
volume of credit as an alternative to the volume of money as a 
determinant of income (B.J. Friedman 1983). Unfortunately, this is 
a case of measurement without theory. 
Insofar as credit markets are taken account of at all, they are sup-
posed to function smoothly (cf. B. Hansen 1970 Ch. 7 for a general 
discussion of general equilibrium models with credit markets). The 
literature on developing countries takes a different view from the 
macroeconomic theory books. Especially since the studies by R.I. 
McKinnon (1973) and E.S. Shaw (1973), much has been made of badly 
functioning credit markets as an impediment to economie development. 
In developed market economies credit markets do function smoothly 
most of the time, but that does not warrant theoretical neglect. 
Occasionally a crisis occurs, in which confidence in certain groups 
of financial institutions suddenly falls to a very low level and 
creditors try to withdraw the funds they lent or deposited. Or if 
such crises do not occur, there is at least the danger that they 
may occur. Such crises are generally considered to be isolated 
occurrences, not endogenous to the system. Even if that
 were true, 
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they can be bad enough. A good case can be made for the proposition 
that the Great Depression of 1929-1933 was so serious because of the 
breakdown of the credit system, both in the United States and in 
Central Europe. The discussion on the causes and propagating forces 
of the Great Depression has mainly remained within the bounds of the 
Monetarist-Keynesian controversy, with the Monetarists seeing inept 
monetary policy as the culprit and more Keynesian-oriented economists 
stressing real disturbances. M. Friedman and A.J. Schwartz for 
instance point to the rapid decline in the stock of money as the 
main cause of the severity and the duration of the Great Depression 
(M. Friedman and A.J. Schwartz 1963 Ch. 7, especially p. 301). 
On the Keynesian side, Temin stresses the fall in consumption, while 
acknowledging a minor role for financial variables, such as attempts 
to reduce indebtedness (P. Temin 1976, especially p. 171 - '2). 
Galbraith too focuses on real variables: insufficiënt investment, 
trouble transmitted from agriculture, a bad income distribution that 
made consumption highly sensitive to wealth reductions ( a fall in 
stock market prices), a bad corporate structure and a bad banking 
structure that made bankruptcies cause domino effects, a dubious 
state of foreign balance and a poor state of economie intelligence 
(J.K. Galbraith 1961 pp. 193 ff.). With Keynes himself the cause 
of the cyclical downturn lay in a fall in the marginal efficiency 
of capital, foliowed by an increase in liquidity preference. Both 
factors make investment decline. At the same time, the propensity 
to consume falls, because of an inequal income distribution, which 
makes consumption sensitive to a fall in the value of securities 
(Keynes 1936 Ch. 22). 
Keynesians, as we see, allow a role for financial variables, but it 
is not a centre-stage role. In contrast, in Irving Fisher's debt-
deflation theory, a rapid shrinking of the volume of credit is what 
characterizes great depressions (I. Fisher 1933). Moreover, such a 
shrinkage need not be exogenous. Scant attention has been paid to 
this theory. That is the more remarkable as Fisher is the patron 
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saint of the monetarists, who, mistakenly, only refer to his formu-
lation of the quantity theory of money and his interest theory. It 
must be admitted that a shrinking of the volume of credit entails a 
shrinking of the volume of money, as the greater part of the money 
supply is created by the banks granting credit. They are not synony-
mous, however, as not only commercial banks grant credit. 
During the past couple of decades Fisher's debt-deflation theory has 
been revived and elaborated by Hyman Minsky. The only other economist 
who, to the best of my knowledge, has taken Fisher's debt-deflation 
theory seriously recently is James Tobin. He does not analyse 
credit markets explicitly, but traces the shifts of the IS- and 
LM-curves that résult from debt deflation (Tobin 1980 Ch. 1). 
Our attention will be reserved for Hyman Minsky's approach, which 
concentrates on the credit market. With tenacious single-mindedness 
Minsky defends his proposition that capitalism has an innate tendency 
to develop financial crises periodically, which in principle could 
lead to debt deflation and depression. Minsky has been left crying 
in the wilderness. The economics profession seems to have little 
time for his ideas (see the comments by J.S. Flemming, R.W. 
Goldsmith and J. Melitz in C.P. Kindleberger and J.P. Laffargue 
(eds) 1982 on Minsky 1982b). On the other hand, C.P. Kindleberger, 
as great an expert on financial crises as anybody, has some kind 
words for Minsky (C.P. Kindleberger 1978 p. 8, 15 ff). 
I will first give a recapitulation of Fisher's theory, after that 
expound Minsky's theory and then see if these are of any use in 
understanding the present financial system and its problems. 
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2. Irving Fisher's Debt-Deflation Theory 
In Fisher's view, there are two dominant factors in great booms and 
depressions, se. over-indebtedness and after that deflation. Even if 
there is no clearcut criterion of over-indebteness (Fisher 1933 
• p. 345), at some point of time it emerges in the sense that debtors 
or creditors or both become alarmed at the volume of debt and 
the burden of interest and repayment liabilities. This leads to the 
following chain of events (Fisher 1933 p. 342). Debt is liquidated. 
To that end distress selling occurs: inventories and other assets 
are sold at whatever prices can be fetched. Bank loans are paid off, 
which reduces the money supply. At the same time, the velocity of 
circulation of money is reduced. All this leads to a fall in the 
price level. The net worth of business firms falls, which leads to 
bankruptcies. Profits disappear, which causes a reduction in produc-
tion and employment. Confidence is lost and spending is further 
reduced, as is the velocity of circulation. The nominal rate of 
interest falls, but the real rate rises. 
It is the combination of over-indebtedness and deflation (in the 
sense of a fall in the price level) that is at the heart of the 
problem. With either over-indebtedness without deflation or deflation 
without over-indebtedness things would be much less serious. 
Over-indebtedness and deflation reinforce each other. Over-indebted-
ness leads to deflation. Deflation leads to an increase in the real 
value of debts. The efforts to liquadate debts are increased, leading 
to further deflation and so on. In great depressions, as in 1929 
through 1933, the liquidation defeats itself, the very effort of 
people to lessen their burden of debt increases it. 
In this view of Fisher's the money supply is important. Like Friedman 
and Schwartz more than thirty years later, he argued that there might 
have been a stock market crash, but not a deep depression if the 
Federal Reserve System had taken action to counteract the decline in 
the money supply and the fall in prices - as it might have done 
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but for Governor Benjamin Strong's - of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York - untimely death in 1928 (I. Fisher 1933 p. 347, M. Friedman 
and A.J. Schwartz 1963 pp. 44 ff.). The policy advice may be the 
same, the analysis is not. In Fisher's view it is not only the 
diminution in the quantity of money that plays havoc with the system, 
but also the reduction in the velocity of circulation of money. This 
reduction cannot, as in Standard monetarist analyses, be attributed 
to a fall in the rate of interest and in inflation expectations, in 
accordance with a stable money demand function, but results from a 
loss of confidence and from bankruptcies, i.e. from a loss of wealth 
and the fear of such losses, whilst the increase in the real value 
of debt during a deflation also exerts a negative influence on the 
velocity of circulation. This follows from asymmetries in the reac-
tions of debtors and creditors to changes in the real value of debt. 
Debtors will reduce their spending when real debt increases, but 
creditors will hardly increase their spending, firstly because they 
do not feel sure that the higher real claims can be realized and 
secondly because they have a lower propensity to spend than debtors, 
which is why they have lent the money to them in the first place. 
Moreover, Fisher stresses the endogeneity of the money supply more 
than Friedman and Schwartz do, though it is true that with Friedman 
and Schwartz the money supply, given the volume of base money, also 
has endogenous elements. In their view the money multiplier got 
smaller because of an increase in the banks' liquidity ratio, for 
fear of being turned down at the Fed's discount window, and a rise 
in the public's currency/bank money ratio, as its confidence in the 
banks waned (M. Friedman and A.J. Schwartz 1963 pp. 332-350). For 
Friedman and Schwartz, the collapse of the credit system was not an 
important factor in itself: "If they (the bank failures) had occurred 
to precisely the same extent without producing a drastic decline in 
the stock of money, they would have been notable but not crucial. If 
they had not occurred, but a correspondingly sharp decline had been 
produced in the stock of money by some other means, the contraction 
would have been at least equally severe and probably even more so." 
(M. Friedman and A.J. Schwartz 1963 p. 352). 
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Up till now only Fisher's view on the depression has been given. 
However, before the depression there must be a boom, from which the 
over-indebtedness sterns. The main cause, in Fisher's view, is that 
there appear to be highly profitable investment opportunities 
(Fisher 1933 p. 348). 
So Fisher avoids the one-sidedness of both extreme Keynesians and 
extreme monetarists: autonomous expenditure plays a role (investment), 
credit is important and the money supply is for a great part endoge-
nous; on the other hand, the money supply has a decisive influence on 
prices and a monetary policy aimed at preventing a fall in the price 
level would do much to reduce the seriousness of a depression. 
From Fisher's analysis it also follows that it may be important to-
prevent over-indebtedness in the first place. 
3. Minsky's theory of financial instability 
In an uninterrupted stream of publications, H.P. Minsky has propounded 
his theory that capitalism has an innate tendency to develop finan-
cial instability, defined as a process in which rapid and accelera-
ting changes in the prices of assets (both financial and capital) 
•take place relative to the prices of current output (H.P. Minsky 
1982b p. 13; see for Minsky's theory also H.P. Minsky 1964; H.P. 
Minsky 1976 and the collection of articles, written over a quarter 
of a century, in H.P. Minsky 1982a). 
Minsky's argument runs as follows. During economically good times, 
households, business firms and financial institutions show a tendency 
to become more lax as to their financial structure. As memories of 
the preceding bad times fade, economie units feel less inhibited to 
increase the ratios of debts to income and of debts to liquid assets. 
This makes the financial system more susceptible to disturbances. 
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Minsky distinguishes three kinds of economie units: hedge-finance 
units, speculative finance units and Ponzi-finance units, depending 
on the time structure of expected gross profits minus payment commit-
ments. We denote anticipated gross profits or quasi-rents, that is 
after tax-revenues from sales or income from assets less running 
expenses, by AQ. , with subscripts denoting periods. Expected payment 
commitments from the existing and expected future liability structure 
are denoted by P C . Hedge-f inance units are characterized by the f act 
that expected gross profits exceed expected payment commitments due 
to debts in every relevant period, or 
AQ. > PC. for all i. 
1 1 
The net worth of the economie unit is the present value of antici-
pated gross profits minus payment commitments. Combining the formulas 
given in Minsky 1972 (repr. in Minsky 1982a, p. 137) and Minsky 1982b 
(p. 21), net worth (NW) is 
AQ - PC 
NW = I ki  
1 = 1
 (1 + r. )i 
r. is the risk-free market rate of interest for the relevant time-to-
ï 
maturity class of assets and liabilities; k is a correction factor 
reflecting uncertainty. 
For hedge-finance units, all periods contribute positively to net 
worth . This implies that a change in interest rates cannot make 
net worth negative. 
For a speculative-finance unit, AQ^ < PC^ at first, and only for 
later periods AQ^ > PCj_. The deficit of expected gross profits over 
payment commitments is a result of a portion of the principal on 
debt falling due in the near term. The income portion of gross pro-
fits at all times exceeds the income or interest portion of payment 
commitments. In other words, debt-repayment exceeds the debt-repayment 
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funds that are generated by a unit's assets. The net worth of specu-
lative-finance units is sensitive to interest rate movements. 
A rise in interest rates will reduce the positive contribution to 
net worth of far-away periods more than it reduces the negative con-
tribution of the near term. A rise in interest rates therefore reduces 
the net worth of speculative-finance units. Solvency, i.e. the degree 
to which debts can be paid off in case of liquidation of the firm, 
becomes endangered. 
Another characteristic is that, whereas hedge-finance units are not 
heavily dependent on financial markets for their normal functioning, 
speculative-finance units frequently have to contract new debts and 
thus are to a high degree dependent on smoothly-functioning financial 
markets. Speculative-finance units include banks and other financial 
institutions, treasuries with floating debts, and ordinary business 
firms that roll over bank debt and commercial paper. 
Finally, there is a special kind of speculative-finance unit, the 
Ponzi-finance unit. For Ponzi-finance units the income portion of 
payment commitments exceeds the income portion of cash receipts 
during a long period. As time goes by, Ponzi-finance units have. to 
contract ever more debt, until in the end a concentrated large income 
stream comes in, which should permit the unit to pay off all debts. 
Ponzi-finance is called after Mr. Charles Ponzi, a dubious Boston 
financier who attracted deposits by offering depositors a high rate 
of interest and had to attract ever more deposits in order to fulfil 
his interest obligations (H.P. Minsky 1977, reprinted in H.P. Minsky 
1982a, p. 70). But not all Ponzi financing is necessarily of a 
dubious nature. Ponzi finance characterizes any scheme where interest 
is paid before revenues are generated and therefore is a normal 
feature of a large part of investment in process. 
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Ponzi-finance units are even more sensitive to interest-rate changes 
than normal speculative-finance units. A rise in the rate of interest 
makes the outstanding debt of the unit grow faster (unless it carries 
a fixed rate of interest) and so does not much to reduce the present 
value of future debt commitments, whilst the present value of the 
expected receipts in the far future, for instance from the sale of 
real estate, sharply falls, the more so as those receipts themselves 
may be inversely related to the rate of interest. All this makes the 
functioning of Ponzi-finance units even more dependent upon uninter-
rupted access to financial markets than normal speculative-finance 
units. 
Let us now start from a situation where hedge-finance units dominate 
in the economy. According to Minsky, it appears profitable in such a 
situation to contract short-term debt, because such debt is relatively 
cheap. The lower cost of borrowed funds leads to an increase in the 
demand for capital assets. The price of capital assets rises and 
investment demand increases. Increased investment leads to increased 
profits (see below for Minsky's theory of investment; his profit 
theory is based upon very simple Kaleckian identities and will be 
neglected here). Higher profits give a further boost to speculative 
finance. In the process, the ratios of debts to income and debts to 
liquid assets rise. Consequently, more economie units become more 
dependent upon recurrent recourse to financial markets in order to 
finance their assets. The financial structure becomes fragile instead 
of robust. A financial system is called fragile when "modest changes 
in cash flows, capitalization rates, and payment commitments adversely 
affect the ability of private units to meet their financial commit-
ments" (H.P. Minsky 1982b p. 24). A financial system is robust when 
this is not so. 
With increased debt-income and debt-liquid assets ratios, a given 
percentage decline in income will make it more difficult for the unit 
to meet its payment commitments from its normal sources or its cash 
balance. Hedge-finance units turn into speculative units and specula-
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tive units find it more difficult to refinance their positions. 
Besides, as the demand for credit increases and lending becomes more 
risky, the rate of interest rises. Higher interest rates increase the 
cost of production of investment goods with long gestation periods. 
At the same time, they lower their demand price. How this may lead 
to a Fisherine debt deflation is explained in the next section. 
Investment in Minsky's approach 
Minsky has clarified his ideas on the relationship between investment 
and financial conditions with the help of a diagram (H.P. Minsky 1976 
p. 108). 
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The diagram depicts the relevant information for the investment 
decision of a representative firm. Q. is gross profits after taxes 
and after required payments on debts and dividends expected for the 
next period; it is the internal finance expected to be available. 
Px is the supply price of the capital asset demanded by the firm, 
given money wages, prices of purchased inputs and the capital costs 
of investment goods as they are produced. The internal financing 
marginal lenders risk 
. ^ ^ 
A 
• 
-ér-
-PK 
., lender's risk 
^ borrower's risk 
p>' 
x~~~ 
r i 
—Q, internal funds 
investment 
12 
constraint depicted as a function of the supply price of the capital 
asset is a rectangular hyperbola. 
If the firm had to rely entirely on internal funds, it would buy 01 
investment goods. Barring the possibility of drawing down available 
cash or selling assets, more investment goods can only be bought if 
debts are contracted. For investment to take place, the price of 
investment goods, that is the supply price of capital assets, must be 
lower than the capitalized value of expected future earnings. This 
capitalized value is the demand price of the capital asset, that is 
the highest price it pays the investor to pay without expecting to 
incur losses. The demand price P^ is found by discounting AQ's or 
anticipated quasi-rents for future periods. 
Given the mate of interest on loans of the relevant risk and tenn-to-
maturity class, the discount rate depends upon the 'market valuation 
of owning rights to an uncertain, fluctuating stream of yields Q as 
against owning rights to a stream of fixed interest payments. 
Let us assume, as in the diagram, that the supply price of capital 
P-j. is lower than the demand price for capital Pjr. In the situation 
depicted in the diagram, 01 will be invested during the next period 
out of internal funds. In a world where the firm is a price taker 
both in the product and factor markets and in the credit market and 
where problems of risk and uncertainty don't count, there would be 
no limit to the firm's demand for capital assets. However, in the 
real world markets are not perfect and firms are not price takers. 
Minsky distinguishes between borrower's risk and lender's risk, 
focusing attention on the financial markets and leaving the implica-
tions of imperfect competition on product markets out of considera-
tion. Borrower's risk increases the discount factor applied to expected 
future earnings in calculating contant value or demand price. 
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Borrower's risk has two aspects. First, increased investment in one 
line of production means iess diversification and therefore a higher 
risk relative to the wealth of the firm or asset owner. Second, with 
more debt-financed investment and therefore a decrease in the capital-
asset ratio, less risks can be taken in order not to endanger the 
firm's solvency and expected future net yields are discounted at a 
higher rate. 
As a result of borrower's risk the demand price for capital falls at 
some volume of investment (note that if the firm is a price maker, 
this fall would be steeper, as investment leads to increased production, 
which could only be sold at lower prices). Lender's risk follows from 
the increased uncertainty and riskiness of claims to the firm as debt-
financed investment increases. This leads to lenders asking higher 
interest rates, shorter terms to maturity, etcetera. 
Expected payment commitments (PC) increase. So the cost of a new 
capital asset to the investing firm is its supply price plus the 
capitalized value of whatever the firm has to pay lenders over and 
above a risk-free interest rate in order to induce them to part with 
their money. With a lag, all debt will, upon refinancing, have to 
conform to the marginal contract. Higher cost of a marginal new 
capital asset will in due time lead to higher costs of the intra-
marginal assets, too. In the diagram, an increase 'in the cost of the 
capital goods, represented by the lender's risk curve, increases 
marginal cost even more and the relevant curve for the investment 
decision is the marginal lender's risk curve. In passing, it may be 
noted that the firm will apply a lower discount rate to PC's than to 
AQ's, as payment commitments are certain, while expected earnings are 
not (in other words, 0 < k. < 1 in the net worth formula in the 
ï 
preceding section). 
We now tracé what happens over the business cycle. Let us assume that 
investment and income in the economy turn out to be higher than 
expected, for instance as a result of finance being more easily 
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available. The firm has more internal funds available for its invest-
ments. Debt charges are lower than expected and profits per equity 
share correspondingly higher. The demand price for capital, PK, 
increases. Both borrowers and lenders are willing to increase the 
volume of debt. The marginal lender's risk curve and the borrower's 
risk curve move to the right and f latten out. 
As the boom proceeds more and more short-term debt at ever more 
onerous conditions is contracted. Interest rates rise. As a result, 
costs of production increase and profits fall - the more so as wages 
will also show a tendency to increase. Cash flows may fall short of 
the-short-term need for cash due to debts. 
Hedge-finance units become speculative-finance units. Borrowers 
become cagey. They do not want to contract new debt or if they would, 
do not succeed. They try to retire debt or build up a fund of liquid 
assets. The point of intersection of the borrower's risk curve and 
the marginal lender's risk curve moves to the left, as both curves 
now run more steeply. Moreover, both curves will bodily shift to the 
left because aggregate investment falls and profits consequently 
decline. The supply price of capital assets rises (Pj moves upward). 
The demand price falls (Pjr moves downward), because of lower demand 
(summed over all firms) and more onerous conditions for borrowing 
money. The prices of capital assets may fall even more if economie 
units are forced to sell assets, such as when conglomerates sell 
subsidiaries. If the authorities do not intervene, the economy may 
slide off into a debt deflation. 
It will be clear that Minsky's theory of investment is quite similar 
to Tobin's (cf Tobin 1971, especially p. 330). In Tobin's view 
investment depends upon the relationship between the value of capital 
and its replacement cost, i.e. the relationship between the market 
price of existing capital goods and the price of currently produced 
capital goods. Tobin studied the general equilibrium properties of the 
system, given the marginal physical product of capital assets, and 
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not the implications of fluctuating financial conditions. Nevertheless, 
the mechanism linking financial conditions to investment spending is 
not much different. Tobin traces the influence of monetary policy on 
investment. 
An expansionary monetary policy leads to inflation and drives up the 
real rate of return on capital goods relative to the real rate of 
return on money holdings, which acts as a spur to investment. Minsky 
also uses a portfolio composition argument to link the money supply 
to the volume of investment. Starting from the notorious chapter on 
"The essential properties of capital and money" from Keynes's 
General Theory (J.M. Keynes 1936 Ch. 17), he argues that an increase 
in the money supply lowers the marginal liquidity premium on money 
holdings (until some floor is reached), which increases the relative 
attractiveness of holding capital goods (H.P. Minsky 1976 p. 90). 
Portfolio shifts from money into capital goods due to inflation play 
no explicit role in Minsky's analysis. 
Tobin's q-ratio approach has been put to an empirical test by Von 
Furstenberg. q , defined as the ratio of the market value of the 
liabilities of non-financial corporations to the replacement cost of 
their assets, did indeed explain a large part of the variance in the 
annualized orders and investment rates in the United States over the 
period 1952:1 - 1976:IV (G.M. von Furstenberg 1977 p. 359). But 
capacity utilization explains investment at least as well (G.M. von 
Furstenberg 1977 p. 374). 
Anyhow, the investment equation is notoriously difficult to specify 
(cf L.R. Klein 1974) and if one factor such as q is found to have a 
significant impact on investment, that is as much as can reasonably 
be asked. Moreover, it seems that of the factors that influence q, 
those related to current and prospective earnings - to the marginal 
efficiency of capital - do affect investment, whereas the cost of 
capital does not (cf Tobin's comment in G.M. von Furstenberg 1977, 
p. 402). This accords with Minsky's view that, at least during a boom, 
investors are not easily deterred by mere higher interest rates. 
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A Note on the Interest Elasticity of Net Worth 
Minsky makes much of the threat that interest rate increases pose for 
speculative finance units, such as financial institutions. The bur-
geoning literature on the concept of duration helps to give more 
precision to the idea of the sensitivity of a firm's net worth to 
interest rate changes. The duration of a security or a portfolio is 
a weighted average of the periods to the moments that interest and 
principal payments are to be received or when they are to be paid, in 
the case of liabilities. The present value of a security the princi-
pal of which is to be received (or paid) af ter n periods, is 
n
 C A P = I 1 + 2: 
i=l (1 + r) 1 (1 + r) n 
P = present value, C = interest payments, A = principal. 
C and A are weighed so as to reflect risk and uncertainty, r is the 
going risk-free market rate of interest. For the sake of simplicity 
we assume a flat term structure of interest rates. 
Duration is defined as 
n 
C l i (1 + r ) _ 1 + An (1 + r)" n 
i=l 
D = 
The point is that the maturity of a security does not give enough 
information as to its interest rate sensitivity. Coupon payments must 
be taken account of too. 
The interest elasticity of P follows from 
= - r iC (1 + r)- 1" 1 - An (1 + r)"11"1 dP 
d r
 i-1 
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and multiplication by r/P: 
n 
dP_ £ 
dr ' P 
I Ci (1 + r ) " 1 + nA (1 + r ) ~ n 
i=l 
1 + r 
It follows that the interest elasticity of the present value of an 
asset or liability, or a portfolio of assets or liabilities, is 
equal to duration times minus r/(l + r). 
It is sometimes argued that a firm can make its net worth insensitive 
to interest rate changes if it makes sure that the duration of its 
assets equals the duration of its liabilities. This is only correct 
when the net worth of the firm is included in the liabilities (cf De 
Man a.o. 1982 p. 161; Bierwag, Kaufman and Toevs 1983 p. 30). Equal 
duration means equal interest elasticity. If the duration of the 
assets is equal to the duration of the liabilities exclusive of 
(positive) net worth, a rise in the rate of interest will decrease 
the present value of the assets more than the present value of the 
liabilities and net worth falls. In order to immunize the impact of 
interest rate changes on net worth, the duration of the liabilities 
must exceed the duration of the assets. In other words, the weighted 
average length of time for which payments are deferred from the pre-
sent must exceed the weighted average length of time for which 
receipts are deferred from the present (Santoni 1984 p. 11). 
It would seem that Minsky errs on the safe side in proposing hedge-
finance units as the paragon of financial stability. The net worth 
of such units will not become negative as a result of interest rate 
changes, but it may fall. Net worth need not fall if the duration of 
the liabilities exceeds the duration of the assets to some extent. It 
is not necessary that the net expected cash flow is positive for all 
future periods, as is the case with hedge-finance units. 
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The trouble with net present value and duration approaches is that 
they are not easy to apply in empirical research. This is because 
formal time-to-maturity may differ from effective time-to-maturity 
for a number of assets and liabilities and, moreover, detailed data 
on formal time-to-maturity are not easily available. Also a number 
of assets and liabilities carry variable interest rates. That presents 
no special difficulties: in case of interest rate increases firms 
with a predominance of variable rate assets and fixed rate liabilities 
are in a favourable position; if it's the other way round they are in 
an unfavourable position. 
If simulations of the impact of interest rate changes on net worth 
are not feasible, one can try to regress the market valuation of the 
equity shares of a firm or group of firms on interest rate changes. 
Such calculations have been made by Flannery (1981) and Santoni (1984). 
Flannery studied the published data on 15 large American commercial 
banks to compute the sensitivity of total operating expenses, gross 
operating income, and the difference between the two, net current 
operating earnings, net of taxes, with respect to interest rate changes 
(12-month Treasury bill yields) over the period 1959-1978. He found 
an average estimated speed of adjustment of asset yields to current 
market rates of 0.442, compared with a speed of adjustment of 0.356 
for liabilities. This corresponds to an average asset maturity of 
1.26 years and an average liability maturity of 1.81 years. A rise in 
the rate of interest will increase net current operating earnings in 
the short run. After some time the rates on both assets and liabilities 
adjust to current market rates. Flannery found that for 13 of the 
sample's 15 banks market rates have no statistically significant 
long-term impact on net current operating earnings. 
A few notes are in order. Operating costs include non-interest costs, 
especially labour. These costs will show an upward trend and probably 
do not explain variability in costs. Still, Flannery's results are 
not purely attributable to interest rate changes. 
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Secondly, in the long run net current operating earnings remain 
approximately constant as a percentage of total assets after a 
change in the market rate of interest. If the capital-assets ratio 
remains constant, this means a constant return on equity. If the rate 
of interest, and therefore the discount rate applied to future net 
earnings, rises, the market value of the firm's shares falls. This 
seems to make Flannery's results compatible with Santoni's. Santoni 
regressed quarterly data on the percentage change in indexes of share 
prices on the percentage change in the Corporate Aaa bond rate over 
the period 1961 - 1983. The indexes were Standard and Poor's indexes 
of share prices of 400 industrial firms, banks outside of New York 
City, New York City banks, and savings and loan holdings companies. 
Apart from the rate of interest, the real GNP growth rate was included 
as an explanatory variable. For all groups of firms, the estimated 
interest elasticity of the capital values was negative: -0.4 for 
industrial firms, around -0.9 for both groups of commercial banks and 
-2.4 for savings and loans. Santoni argues that the numerically low 
elasticities for the financial institutions are to explained by their 
portfolios consisting of relatively long-term assets and short-term 
liabilities. This does not square with Flannery's findings. For savings 
and loans, with a very high proportion of mortgage loans, Santoni's 
explanation may be right, but for commercial banks Flannery offers 
the more likely explanation. 
6. Monetary policy and fiscal policy 
In Minsky's view, it is difficult for the monetary authorities to 
restrain a euphoric boom (H.P. Minsky 1972, repr. in Minsky 1982a 
pp. 138-142). Investors have rosy expectations and are not to be 
deterred by a rise in the rate of interest. Restrictive monetary 
policy measures lack bite because of financial innovations, which 
compensate for any restriction in the growth of the money supply by 
an increase in the velocity of circulation and enable investors to 
borrow funds and drive up asset prices. 
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A restrictive monetary policy may work in a non-euphoric situation, 
where the expectations of economie units are not wildly optimistic 
and they are not willing to lower their capital-asset and liquidity 
ratio's too much. If a euphoric boom is under way, monetary restric-
tion only works if it forces economie units to sell assets or fund 
positions and in that way cause assets prices to fall. This fall will 
be the more steep as asset prices reflect inflationary and real growth 
expectations (as is often the case with shares and real estate) and 
restrictive monetary policy brings such expectations to an end. The 
danger is that a debt deflation may result. Indeed, it is Minsky's 
conviction that since the 1960's, successful monetary constraint has 
always pushed the economy to the brink of a debt deflation, in the 
U.S. at least (H.P. Minsky 1980, repr. in Minsky 1982a, p. 77). 
When a financial crisis develops, the central bank can help to prevent 
a debt deflation, and after 1933 such deflations have not occurred. 
The central bank has to act as a lender of last resort to speculative-
finance units that see the flow of funds they need dry up. In that 
way it prevents a sharp fall in asset prices, thus reducing the number 
of business failures and the severity of the fall in investment. But 
the greatest check to a downward spiralling of national income is big 
government, which acts as a stabilizer of national income and profits 
by running deficits when national income falls. The failure of a 
couple of Ponzi-finance units then will not set off a disastrous 
chain of events. 
The price of the help which the central bank and the government offer 
is, according to Minsky, inflation. As the interventions by the autho-
rities reduce the fear of a fall in profits, economie units become 
increasingly willing to debt-finance their assets (H.P. Minsky 1980b, 
repr. in Minsky 1982a, p. 43). In this way, even poorly chosen invest-
ment projects are validated, which leads to stagnating labour produc-
tivity and inflation (ibidem, pp. 56-'7). Moreover, in a full-employ-
ment economy, wages will rise more than is warranted by productivity 
growth and quasi-rents will fall (H.P. Minsky 1976 p. 140). 
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Concluding remarks 
Recent history does not corroborate the view that higher and higher 
inflation combined with stagnation is inevitable. Big. government does 
not in itself validate poor investment decisions. Even when budget 
deficits run high, there may be a recession of sorts where inefficiënt 
producers are pruned out. 
It appears that the innate financial instability of capitalist econo-
mies must not be taken as something inevitable, but as a tendency that 
may develop. Something can be done against it. 
The monetary authorities can supervise the financial institutions 
and see to it that capital-assets ratios do not deteriorate during 
good times. This may help the market to maintain confidence in the 
financial institutions when negative shocks occur. The monetary 
authorities can of course do nothing to promote financial orthodoxy 
in non-financial firms. There may be a case f.or variable demands by 
the authorities as to liquidity and capital-asset ratio's over the 
business cycle, with prescribed minimum ratio's going up during good 
times and going down af ter a fall in asset prices. This would enable 
the financial institutions to write off bad debts, stimulate recovery 
from a cyclical trough and help prevent overheating of the economy. 
The difficulty of course is that such demands must not only be made 
on commercial banks, but on all financial institutions. Otherwise 
commercial banks would be placed in a disadvantageous position 
vis-a-vis other financial institutions. This would divert business to 
financial institutions on which the monetary authorities have less, 
or no, grip and might weaken the stability of the financial system, 
the more so as less reputable characters may be attracted to the 
credit industry in that case. 
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It seems better to step on the brake by sharpening balance sheet 
requirements in an early stage rat'her than rely only on monetary 
restriction in a late phase of the cyclical upswing. Nevertheless, 
the central bank must stand ready to act as a lender of last resort. 
It may be impossible to exclude financial crises altogether. It may 
even be undesirable to do so, as a mildly serious shock every now 
and then may be wholesome and prevent business firms and financial 
institutions becoming too complacent. When such a shock occurs, some 
financial institutions may find it temporarily impossible to attract 
funds, which of course has repercussions for business firms in need 
of external funds too. As Walter Bagehot remarked: " After a great 
calamity, everybody is suspicious of everybody; as soon as that 
calamity is forgotten, everybody again confides in everybody" 
(W. Bagehot 1920 p. 125). What may be true for great calamities, 
may also be true for small calamities. 
It may be true that the certainty of a lender of last resort being 
at hand may lead to laxer financial mores. Therefore, small crises 
that lead to the failure of one or a very few banks, preferably to 
a take-over with only some loss for the shareholders, may fuifil a 
useful role. But history suggests that financial crises where no 
lender-of-last-resort facilities were offered have been foliowed 
by much larger and deeper depressions than financial crises where 
such facilities have been offered (vide C.P. Kindleberger 1978, 
especially Ch. 11). A lender of last resort, or at least an organizer 
of safety nets, is what is needed to prevent Fisher-Minsky debt 
deflations. 
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